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Abstract
This paper analyses the need of extension of Geographical Indication (GI) protection since the current 
protection under Trade Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is insufficient to cover all 
products as a result of discriminatory provisions in TRIPS regulating a greater protection to wines and 
spirits only and different level of GI protection under Article 22 and Article 23 TRIPS. This paper then 
assumes that the extensive GI protection for all products should be supported because it would give greater 
benefits particularly to developing countries such as prevent the free riding, attract regional investment 
and obtain market power.
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Intisari 
Perlindungan Indikasi Geografis (IG) perlu diperluas tidak hanya pada produk tertentu seperti wines dan 
spirits karena perlindungan IG diatur di dalam TRIPS tidak cukup memberikan perlindungan kepada 
semua produk sebagai akibat perbedaan pengaturan di TRIPS yang memberikan perlindungan lebih kepada 
wines dan spirits saja dan adanya perbedaan tingkat perlindungan pada Pasal 22 dan 23 TRIPS. Perluasan 
perlindungan IG harus didukung karena akan memberikan manfaat khususnya kepada negara berkembang. 
Perluasan perlindungan IG dapat melarang pemboncengan reputasi, menarik investasi dan meningkatkan 
kekuatan produk negara berkembang di pasaran.
Kata Kunci: indikasi geografis, TRIPS, negara berkembang.
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A. Introduction
GI has been protected under Paris Convention, 
Madrid and Lisbon Agreements administered by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, however 
these agreements lack of a coordination, uniformity, 
and dispute settlement mechanisms influencing not 
significantly to the protection of GIs at international 
level.1 The internationalization of GI presents a 
significant advancement when protected under 
TRIPS Agreement in 1994. 
According to Article 22 (1) of TRIPS 
agreement, GI is defined as indications, which 
identify a good as originating in the territory of 
a member, or a region or locality in that territory, 
where a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable 
to its geographical origin. Another provisions of 
TRIPS regulating GI is Article 22.22. 33, 44 and 23.5 
Article 22 provides the general level of protection 
applicable to all GI products and prohibits the use 
of misleading indications or indications which 
constitute an act of unfair competition. Whereas, 
Article 23 of TRIPS provides a higher level of 
protection for wine and spirits prohibiting GI use 
in connection with products not originating from 
the designated geographical region, regardless of 
whether the true origin is indicated or it is used in 
conjunction with words such as “kind” or “type”.6 
It means that Article of 22 of TRIPS provides the 
lower level protection than the Article 23 of TRIPS 
limited to the wine and spirit only. Therefore, the 
limited scope of GI protection under Article 22 
TRIPS renders some WTO member states to ask 
extension of GI protection to all products.
The issue of extending Article 23 TRIPS for 
protection of GI to all products has been controversial 
debate in WTO forum. The opponents of extension 
such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, and Argentina, argue that 
current GI protection under Article 22 TRIPS is 
sufficient and it should be tried to is interpreted more 
extensively before extending the scope of Article 
23. They assume that The GI extension would be 
expensive and hard to justify as such extension will 
be burdensome, costly and bring little benefit to GI 
users.7 However, the proponents8 argue that existing 
GI protection under TRIPS is not sufficient because 
TRIPS currently provides the greater protection 
only for wines and spirits and clearly discriminates 
other products.9 The extension of GI protection 
is important to confer the more effective level of 
protection of Article 23 TRIPS to all products.
1 Cerkia Bramley, et al., 2013, Developing Geographical Indications in the South, Springer, New York, pp. 2-3.
2 In respect of geographical indications, Members shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent: (a) the use of any means in the 
designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the true 
place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good; and (b) any use which constitutes an act of 
unfair competition within the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967).
3 A Member shall, ex officio if its legislation so permits or at the request of an interested party, refuse or invalidate the registration of a trademark 
which contains or consists of a geographical indication with respect to goods not originating in the territory indicated, if use of the indication 
in the trademark for such goods in that Member is of such a nature as to mislead the public as to the true place of origin.
4 The protection under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be applicable against a geographical indication which, although literally true as to the 
territory, region or locality in which the goods originate, falsely represents to the public that the goods originate in another territory.
5 (a) Each Member shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines 
not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying spirits for spirits not originating in the place 
indicated by the geographical indication in question, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical indication is 
used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like; (b) The registration of a trademark 
for wines which contains or consists of a geographical indication identifying wines or for spirits which contains or consists of a geographical 
indication identifying spirits shall be refused or invalidated, ex officio if a Member’s legislation so permits or at the request of an interested 
party, with respect to such wines or spirits not having this origin; (c) In the case of homonymous geographical indications for wines, protection 
shall be accorded to each indication, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 22. Each Member shall determine the practical 
conditions under which the homonymous indications in question will be differentiated from each other, taking into account the need to ensure 
equitable treatment of the producers concerned and that consumers are not misled; and (d) In order to facilitate the protection of geographical 
indications for wines, negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPS concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of 
notification and registration of geographical indications for wines eligible for protection in those Members participating in the system.
6 Ibid.
7 Malcolm Spence, “Geographical Indications (Should We Extend Ourselves Further?)”, http://www.crnm.org/documents/studies/staff%20
papers/Trade_Hot_Topics_181_by_Malcolm_Spence.pdf, accessed on 12 March 2013.
8 The European Union, Switzerland, Hungary, Sri Lanka, Bulgaria, India, Kenya, Jamaica, Egypt, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Turkey, Venezuela, the Czech Republic, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Slovenia and the African Group are the main 
supporters of the GI extension.
9 Malcolm Spence, Loc.cit.
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This paper will discuss the need of the 
extension of GI protection for developing countries. 
To visualize the idea, the paper will analyses the 
rationales of extending GI protection, the statutory 
mandates for the extension of GI protection, and the 
implication the extension for developing countries. 
Therefore, the second part of the paper will describe 
the argument against and pro will first before 
concluding the rationales behind the extension of 
GI protection. Furthermore, the third part of the 
paper will expose the contention of insufficient 
protection under the Article 22 and 23 of TRIPS 
for all products by analysing the discriminatory 
provision in those articles which provides a greater 
protection to wines and spirits only. This part will 
describe the disparity level of protection between 
article 22 and 23 of TRIPS, and unnecessary test 
or requirement for protection in Article 22 such 
as misleading and unfair competition test, while 
Article 23 only prohibits any use of a GI on wines 
or spirits that do not originate in the designated 
geographical region. Consequently, standard of 
protection under Article 23 allows producers from 
other regions to use GI and free-ride on reputation 
without infringement as long as the product’s true 
origin is indicated. At the fourth section, this paper 
will explore the statutory mandates for the extension 
of GI protection both based on Article 24 TRIPS 
and Doha Declaration. At the further section, the 
implication of the extension of GI protection will 
be exposed such as putting producers of developing 
countries on an equal footing to draw benefits from 
GI protection, preventing the free riding of local 
products, attracting investment in regional products 
and helping developing countries to obtain the 
greater market power. 
B. Discussion
1. The Rationales of Extending GI Protection
a. Argument Against and Pro 
Extension
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Guatemala, New Zealand, Paraguay and 
the United States oppose the extension of 
additional protection to products other than 
wines and spirits. In their view, extension of 
the scope of Article 23 to products other than 
wines and spirits goes beyond the mandate in 
Article 24 (1).10 However, countries mainly 
from Asia, Europe and Africa supporting 
of extending the GI protection argue that 
additional protection should not be limited to 
wines and spirits.11 It is important to include 
other products under the higher protection in 
Article 23 because the additional protection 
for other products would rectify the imbalance 
caused by special protection of wines and 
spirits. 
Opponents also say that there is no 
evidence that Article 22 does not manage 
to protect GI for products other than wines 
and spirits. Definition of GI in Article 22 (1) 
is much broader enough and also applies to 
other products such as industrial or artisan 
products that enjoy a particular reputation 
due to manufacturing know-how.12 They 
further argue that there is lack evidence 
whether extending GI protection would lead 
to a more effective protection than is already 
afforded to those products under Article 
22. However, supporters argue that there is 
discrimination protection between Article 
22 and Article 23 providing the greater 
protection for wines and spirits.13 They also 
argue that there is no logical or legal reasons 
10 O’Connor, 2003, Geographical Indications in National and International Law, O’Connor and Company, Brussel, p. 158.
11 Ibid.
12 Christopher Heath, Anselm Kamperman Sanders (Ed.), 2009, New Frontiers of Intellectual Property Law: IP and Cultural Heritage – 
Geographical Indications – Enforcement – Overprotection, Hart Publishing, Oregon, p. 119.
13 C. Niranjan Rao, “Geographical Indication in Indian Context: a Case Study of Darjeeling Tea”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40 No. 
42, October 2005, p. 8.
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justifying different level of protections 
of GI.14 Article 22 requiring consumer’s 
misleading or producer’s unfair competition, 
creates legal uncertainty, undue burden and 
trade distortions. These requirements place 
a significantly higher threshold and present 
problem of free-riding and risk of a GI being 
rendered generic.
Opponents assume that there is no 
legal basis for extension as the negotiating 
mandate in Article 24.1 concerns only 
“individual geographical indications for 
wines and spirits”,15 not for whole product 
areas. However, indeed Article 24.1 mandates 
negotiations for GI-extension to products 
other than wines and spirits. It is explained 
that a ‘narrow’ reading of Article 24.1 only 
focussed on wines and spirits would further 
aggravate the hierarchy in the levels of GI 
protection.
Opponents suggest that GI-extension 
will involve additional costs for governments 
in legal, financial and administrative burden 
for implementing extension16. They argue 
that extension may need the introduction of 
new legal mechanisms, the financial and ad-
ministrative costs of which would outweigh 
the benefits of extension17. However, worries 
about additional costs to governments are 
overstated18. Extension should not involve 
new additional legal or administrative burden 
as TRIPS members already have these me-
chanisms if they properly comply with Ar-
ticle 23. Furthermore, members are still free 
to protect GIs through their existing legal re-
gimes as they see fit under Article 1.1.TRIPS. 
Article 23 only requires legal means to pre-
vent misuse, therefore as long as members 
provide some way to give effect to Article 23 
GIs, they are free to minimize costs. 
Opponents argue that extension would 
create additional costs for consumers resulting 
from consumer confusion caused by the need 
to re-name and re-label products, as well as 
by the disappearance of terms customarily 
used to identify products.19 However, 
rebelling only applies where some products 
illegitimate using a geographical indication 
is in same product category.20 Also, rename 
and re-label products seems not only logical 
but also justified taking into account the 
consumers protection and confusion, when 
the deceptive label is used.21 The consumers 
confusion on account of new labels will be a 
short-term disruption and effective marketing 
and promotion by ‘right-full holders’ of GIs 
could ease the adjustment process. 
Opponents argue extension needs 
additional cost for producers for trade and 
production disruption. Arguably, extension 
may constitute a burden for producers who 
rely on this technique, but this is only a one-
time cost. The economic long-term benefits 
of extending the more effective protection of 
GIs would clearly in any case outweigh the 
costs for the few cases of relabeling.22 
14 World Trade Organization, “Work on Issue Relevant to the Protection of Geographical Indications: Extension of the Protection for Geographical 
for Wines and Spirits to Geographical Indications for Other Products”, Communication from Bulgaria, Cuba, Mauritius, Nigeria, The Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela”, Paper 
IP/C/W/247/Rev.1, WTO Geneva, 2001, p. 5 (hereinafter WTO I).
15 Roland Knaak, “The Protection of Geographical Indications According to the TRIPS Agreement”, in Friederich-Karl Beier & Gerhard 
Schricker (Eds.), 1996, From GATT to TRIPS—The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Wiley-VCH, 
Munich, pp. 135-139.
16 Bernard O’Connor, 2004, The Law of Geographical Indications, Cameron May, London, p. 35.
17 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, “Communication from Argentina et al”, Paper IP/C/W/289, June 29, 2001, 
pp. 14-18 (hereinafter Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights I).
18 Aaron C. Lang, “On the Need to Expand Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement”, Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L., Vol. 6, 2006, p. 506.
19  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights I, Op.cit., p. 21.
20 Bernard O’Connor, Op.cit., p. 354.
21 Ibid.
22 Felix Addor and Alexandra Grazioli, “Geographical Indications Beyond Wines and Spirits: A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical 
Indications in the WTO/TRIPS Agreement”, J. World Intell. Prop., Vol. 5, 2002, p. 882 (hereinafter Felix Addor, Alexandra Grazioli I).
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Opponent argue that extension would 
close market, block import and affect the 
producer’s activities.23 Demanders do not 
dismiss these possibilities that no doubt 
changes in Article 23 will lead to trade 
disruption and narrowing market access for 
those producers who have been free-riding on 
reputable indications. However, producers in 
locations outside the designated geographical 
area can still produce and sell the good–
naturally without the use of the protected 
indication. The extension would not create a 
barrier to trade, but would instead promote 
trade and investment, in particular for all the 
developing and developed countries which 
depend on exports of GI commodities.24
b. The Reasons for the Extension of GI 
Protection 
The applicable protection regime to 
GI for non wines and non spirits products 
is based on unclear and ambiguous rules.25 
Uncertainty about the conditions in which 
producers operate will affect negatively 
for trade, investment and therefore for 
development. Thus, the legal certainty in the 
regulatory framework for the GI protection 
is clearly needed to put producers and their 
products on an equal position to draw benefits 
from GI.26 The more effective protection and 
facilitated enforcement under the additional 
protection of Article 23 to all products, will 
enhance international trade flows and prevent 
GI from becoming generic in the future and 
therewith from losing all their economic 
value.
 Developing countries has interest 
in GI-extension because of the importance 
of the remunerative marketing of their 
agricultural, handicraft and artisan products.27 
Only by extending the level of protection will 
help producers to adequately protect their 
investment and assist them in competing 
on the global market.28 The benefits of GI-
extension will foster sustainable development 
of local rural communities by encouraging 
a quality local products. It will also foster 
employment in decentralized regions, support 
the establishment of other economic activities 
such as tourism and contribute to preserving 
traditional knowledge and biodiversity.29 It is 
therefore crucial to enhance GI protection.
2.	 Insufficient	 Article	 22	 TRIPS for GI 
Protection
Opponents argue that existing Article 22 is 
sufficient enough for protection against misleading 
uses of GI30 and there is a lack of evidence of the 
ineffectiveness of Article 22 or of concomitant 
economic loss. However, Article 22 is not adequate 
enough as it creates three broad problems of: ‘free-
riding’, the risk of rendering GIs as generic terms, 
and the uncertainty of and undue burden in enforcing 
GI-protection. Also, different requirements in 
Article 22 compared to Article 23 creates disparity 
level of protection and a significantly higher 
threshold.
a. Unnecessary Misleading Test and 
Unfair Competition Requirement
In enforcing GI protection, Article 
23 Bernard O’Connor, Op.cit., p. 352.
24 Ibid, at 324.
25 UNCTAD – ICTSD, 2005, The Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 296.
26  Mathias Schaeli, “Perspectives for Geographical Indications: Extension of the Protection of Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to All Products: 
A Promising Solution for Developing An Appropriate International Legal Framework for the Protection of Geographical Indications”, Paper 
WIPO/GEO/BEI/07/11, WIPO International Symposium on Geographical Indications, Beijing, 26-28 June 2007, p. 2.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29  UNDP, “Geographical Indications as Trade-Related Intellectual Property”, Discussion Paper, Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Initiative, 
UNDP Regional Centre, Colombo, January 2007, p. 11.
30  WTO Council for TRIPS, “Implications of Article 23 Extension, Communication from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, Chinese Taipei and the United States”, Paper IP/C/W/386, 
November 2002, p. 2.
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22.231 TRIPS requires not only consumers 
misleading test, but also unfair competition 
test.32 These requirements represent an 
imbalance that will unfairly distort trade 
between wine-producing countries and 
others. It is unfair burdens for producers of 
other goods to prove consumer confusion 
or unfair competition. The low standard 
in Article 22 will allow free-riding by the 
company from developed countries to rely 
on the investments and labour of other 
producers who have infused the GI with an 
outstanding reputation.33 As an infringement 
action under Article 22 requires the plaintiff 
to demonstrate that the public is misled by the 
use of the GI, as a result someone producing 
goods outside the region identified by the GI 
can exploit its reputation easily if the public 
is not confused by such use.34 Therefore, it is 
legal the unauthorized use of protected GIs 
under Article 22 if de-localizing qualifiers are 
used.35 
The free-riding enabled by Article 22 
poses risks to the GI itself becoming generic.36 
The distribution of the follow-on goods can 
have the effect of diluting or tarnishing the 
original GI.37 Worse yet, legally permissible 
free riding can render GIs generic.38 It cannot 
be denied that GIs are emptied of their legal 
effect by repeated free-riding.39 Therefore, 
the risk of GIs becoming generic is a “key 
reason” for demanding extension.40
Opponents argue that there is no 
need to worry about GIs being destroyed 
by free riding because the authentic goods 
originating in the designated geographical 
region will be recognized internationally. 
However, the development of the GI’s 
reputation may be stifled by any free-riding 
that occurs before the original GI becomes 
internationally recognized as signifying 
distinctive quality. An additional result of 
the free-riding is the discouraging producers 
from making investments in GIs. Free riding 
reduces the returns on such investment, and 
many producers would rather take free rides 
than invest in unique indications. Therefore, 
it is critical to protect all GIs as vigorously 
as those in Article 23, in order to reward and 
stimulate investments in the world’s markets.
Requirement of consumer confusion 
in Article 22 also creates legal uncertainty. 
Main goal of the WTO Agreement and a 
common interest of WTO Members is to 
establish and ensure a fair and predictable 
legal framework.41 However, this goal is 
undermined by the unsatisfactory provisions 
of Article 22. The public confusion as 
a prerequisite to an infringement may 
obfuscate the legal proceedings.42 The 
proof required under Article 22 allows wide 
judicial discretion, particularly to test public 
misleading. It is impossible to predict the 
court decision and judges may reach different 
31 See Article 22 (2) TRIPS states that:
  In respect of geographical indications, members shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent: (a) the use of any means in the 
designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the true 
place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good; (b) any use which constitutes an act of unfair 
competition within the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention 1967.
32 Malcolm Spence, Loc.cit.
33 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, “Proposal from Bulgaria”, Paper IP/C/W/247, March 29, 2001, pp. 10-11 
(hereinafter Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights II).
34 Ibid.
35 Felix Addor, Alexandra Grazioli I, Op.cit., p. 879.
36 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights II, Op.cit., p. 12.
37 Dwijen Rangnekar, “Geographical Indications: A Review of Proposals at the TRIPs Council: Extending Article 23 to Products Other than 
Wines And Spirits”, Issue Paper UNTAD-ICTSD, No. 4, June 2003, p. 8 (hereinafter Dwijen Ragnekar I).
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, p. 33.
40 WTO Council for TRIPS, Op.cit., p. 8.
41 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights II, Op.cit., p. 18.
42 Ibid, p. 10.
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decisions on whether the public is misled or 
not.
Opponents argued that Article 22 is 
sufficient to protect GIs, but that it is rarely 
used.43 However, the infrequency uses 
of Article 22 may imply that it is simply 
prohibitive to use in many cases.44 The burden 
of proof requirement in Article 22 creates 
excessive costs for plaintiffs. This cost may 
be prohibitive, especially for producers in 
developing countries. Plaintiffs may not 
proceed if the infringement is less than or if 
the infringement is on a small enough scale 
that the cost of and time-consuming litigation 
would outweigh the market damage. 
b. Disparity Level of Protection 
between Article 22 and Article 23
Article 22 requires the higher threshold 
that the GI holders only have access to legal 
recourse if consumers have been misled by 
the infringing label or if its sale constituted 
an act of unfair competition, whereas Article 
23 nullifies these requirements. To prevent 
the illegitimate use of GI under Article 23, 
producers of wines and spirits only prove 
that the products on which GI is used does 
not originate in the geographic area identified 
by its indication45, whereas producers of 
other goods needs not only prove that there 
is illegitimate use of the GI, but also such a 
use misleads the public or constitutes an act 
of unfair competition.46 Therefore, for wines 
and spirits, the level of protection is higher 
and is not conditional on whether there is 
unfair competition or the public is mislead.
The misleading test in Article 22 is 
“complicated and expensive.47 In contrast, 
there is no this test on the producers for wines 
and spirits. While holders of Article 23 GI are 
protected by a per se rule against unauthorized 
use,48 therefore, incur relatively few costs 
in litigating their GI claims49, GI holders 
of Article 22 face appreciable enforcement 
costs as a result of their burden of proof. 
The disparity level of protection in Article 
22 and 23 has been debated in the WTO.50 
The limited protection granted by Article 
22 as compared to Article 23 of the TRIPS 
Agreement entails several deficiencies. 
Supporters GI-extension find no justification 
or rational basis for the continued existence 
of the two levels of protection in Article 22 
and 23 TRIPS.51 Therefore, extending Article 
22, which does not require the “misleading 
test” or evidence of unfair competition, will 
provide an adequate level of protection to GI 
for all products.
c. No Mandate for Multilateral Re­
gister
TRIPS calls for negotiations to create 
a multilateral register for GIs on Article 23 
goods,52 but not for any other types of GI. 
It means that no mandate for multilateral 
register in Article 22. However, the 
multilateral registered applied in Article 23 
should also be implemented to all products. 
If a multilateral register applied to all 
products, it would prevent free-riding and 
unintentional appropriation of GI. It would 
also enable GI holders to be on timely notice 
43 WTO Council for TRIPS , Op.cit., p. 6.
44 Dwijen Rangnekar I, Op.cit., p. 34.
45 Felix Addor, Alexandra Grazioli, Op.cit., p. 882 .
46 Ibid, p. 881.
47 Steven A. Bowers, “Location, Location, Location: The Case Against Extending Geographical Indication Protection Under the TRIPS 
Agreement”, Aipla Q.J., Vol. 31, 2003, p. 149. 
48 Article 23.1 of TRIPS. See also Dwijen Rangnekar I, Op.cit., p. 34.
49 Ibid, p. 34.
50 Tunisia L. Staten, “Geographical Indications Protection Under the TRIPS Agreement: Uniformity Not Extension”, J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
Soc’y, Vol. 87, 2005, p. 1.
51 WTO I , Op.cit., Paragraph 7.
52 Article 23.4 of TRIPS Agreement.
512 MIMBAR HUKUM Volume 26, Nomor 3, Oktober 2014, Halaman 505-517
of these GIs and take appropriate measures 
such as denying trademark registration 
requests for trademarks containing registered 
GIs pursuant to Article 23.253. As GI’s 
reputation requires significant investment 
and labour, timeliness in GI disputes is 
critical, and the timely notice offered by 
the multilateral register would benefit. The 
timely notice would also minimize costs to 
the producers of the infringing goods because 
they would be able to avoid the mistake of 
investing in marks that would eventually be 
discontinued. Without the register, a member 
might unwittingly register a conflicting 
trademark and forcing the legitimate holder 
of the GI to undo the damage in court. The 
register provides better protection to foreign 
GIs which the holders of these GIs would not 
have to go out of their way to prevent others 
from issuing infringing marks or to litigate 
such infringement.
 In addition, a multilateral register 
would make it easier for GIs holders to defend 
their right in court and reduce the cost of this 
defence. If the registered GIs were given 
the presumption of eligibility for protection, 
the cost savings associated with the defence 
of a registered mark would be profound, as 
the plaintiff would bear no burden of proof. 
However, even if registered GIs were not given 
the presumption of eligibility for protection,54 
the register would stand as strong evidence 
supporting the GI’s legitimacy., In addition, 
registration is a useful tool to ensure equality 
of treatment between national and foreign 
geographical indications, and to being a 
practical instrument for importers, exporters, 
administrative and judicial authorities, 
producers and consumers.55 
3. Statutory Mandates of GI Extension
a. The Mandates of Article 24
The debate in the TRIPS Council 
regarding the extension is the interpretation 
of Article 24, which ambiguously obliges 
Members to enter into negotiations ‘aimed 
at increasing the protection of individual 
geographical indications under Article 23’, 
while simultaneously ensuring that there is no 
reduction in ‘the protection of geographical 
indications that existed in that Member 
immediately prior to the date of entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement’.56 As Article 24 
is ambiguous, there is disagreement between 
Member to negotiate the extension of Article 
23 to all products. 
Opponents argue that there is no direct 
reference to an extension in TRIPS although 
some reliance has been placed on Article 
24(1) and (2). They emphasize that there is 
no mandate for negotiations the extension to 
all products since Article 24.157 is explicitly 
focussed on “individual indications for 
wines and spirits”.58 However, if Article 24.1 
were taken to mean that there should only 
be forthcoming increases in protection for 
Article 23 goods (only wines and spirits), 
53 European Communities, “Negotiations Relating to the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical 
Indications—Issues for Discussion at the Special Session of the TRIPS Council of 28 June 2002—Informal Note”, Paper JOB(02)/70, June 
24, 2002, Paragraph 22. 
54 Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Special Session, “Proposal for a Multilateral System for Notification and 
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement”, Paper TN/IP/W/5, October 
23, 2002. See also Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Special Session, “Multilateral System of Notification and 
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines (and Spirits)”, Paper TN/IP/W/6, October 29, 2002, p. 2.
55 EU Proposal, Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, “Implementation of Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement 
Relating to the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications”, Paper IP/C/W/107/
Rev.1, June 22, 2000, p. 2.
56 Ibid.
57 See Article 24(1) of TRIPS: Members agree to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of individual geographical indications 
under Article 23. The provisions of paragraphs 4 through 8 below shall not be used by a Member to refuse to conduct negotiations or 
to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the context of such negotiations, Members shall be willing to consider the continued 
applicability of these provisions to individual geographical indications whose use was the subject of such negotiations.
58 Roland Knaak, Loc.cit.
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then the groundless hierarchy between 
product categories would be exacerbated 
and it would add to the imbalances already 
existing in Article 22 and 23 which is not 
consistent with the spirit and basic objectives 
of the TRIPS Agreement.59
Proponents reason that Article 24.1 is 
general application to all products and the 
reference to extension.60 Article 24 requires 
Members to negotiate an extension of Article 
23 to cover other types of GIs. In Article 24.1, 
“Members agree to enter into negotiations 
aimed at increasing the protection of 
individual geographical indications under 
Article 23’61. It means that the universe of 
GIs should be expanded62. 
 Even if Article 24.1 were not construed 
to require negotiations regarding extension, 
Article 24.263 still requires the Council 
to “take such actions as may be agreed 
to facilitate the operation and further the 
objectives of this Section”.64 This provision 
can be read to instruct expanding the scope of 
Article 23. Furthermore, the TRIPS Council 
reported to the 1996 Ministerial Conference 
in Singapore explicitly ‘that a review of the 
application of the provisions of the Section 
on Geographical Indications as provided for 
in Article 24.2 […]”.65
b. Mandate of Doha Declaration
Paragraph 18 of Doha Declaration66 
simply mandates that issues related to the 
extension of GI protection would merely be 
negotiated in the Council for TRIPS, whereas 
there was specific agreement to negotiate the 
establishment of a register of geographical 
indications.67 Since then, more specific 
reference to the particular issue of extending 
protection was made in the Ministerial 
Statement coming out of the 6th Meeting 
in Hong Kong in December, 2005.68 WTO 
members expressed different interpretations 
of Doha mandate. For instance, Argentina 
states that there is no agreement to negotiate 
the GI extension and consensus will be 
required in order to launch any negotiations 
on the issue of GI extension. However, 
supporters states that there is a clear mandate 
for extension under Doha Declaration and it 
requires immediate negotiations.69
4. Implication for Developing Countries
The first who suffer from the lack of 
“GI extension” are the producers particularly 
in developing countries who have little or no 
resources to allocate to costly and legally uncertain 
enforcement of their GI by complicated litigation 
requirements. Therefore, extending GI protection 
which does not require complicated requirement 
59 WTO I, Op.cit., p. 6. See also Jim Keon, “Intellectual Property Rules for Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Important Parts of the 
New World Trade Order”, in Carlos Correa & Abdulqawi Yusuf (Eds.), 1998, Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS 
Agreement, Kluwer Law International, London, p. 174.
60 WTO I, Op.cit., Paragraph 12.
61 Article 24.1 of TRIPS.
62 Aaron C. Lang, Op.cit,, p. 505.
63 See Article 24.2 of TRIPS: The Council for TRIPS shall keep under review the application of the provisions of this Section; the first such 
review shall take place within two years of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Any matter affecting the compliance with the 
obligations under these provisions may be drawn to the attention of the Council, which, at the request of a Member, shall consult with any 
Member or Members in respect of such matter in respect of which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through bilateral or 
plural lateral consultations between the Members concerned. The Council shall take such action as may be agreed to facilitate the operation 
and further the objectives of this section.
64 Article 24.2 of TRIPS.
65 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights II, Op.cit., p. 14.
66 Doha Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, WTO Doc WT/MIN/(01)/DEC/1.
67 Mark Davidson, Loc.cit.
68 Ibid.
69 World Trade Organization, “Communication from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, EU, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, The Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey regarding Paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Draft Ministerial 
Declaration”, Paper WT/MIN(01)/W/11, November 14, 2001 (available at http://www.wto.org/ (hereinafter WTO II). See also, World 
Trade Organization, “Communication from India, Bulgaria, Kenya and Sri Lanka regarding Paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Draft Ministerial 
Declaration”, Paper WT/MIN(01)/W/9, November 13, 2001 (hereinafter WTO III).
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such as the “misleading test” or unfair competition, 
will provide an adequate level of protection to 
GI for all products. The stronger GI protection 
would reduce the problem in Article 22 such as 
‘free-riding’, the risk of rendering GIs as generic 
terms, and the uncertainty of and undue burden in 
enforcing GI-protection. 
a. Increasing Investment and Market 
Power
The extensive GI protection would 
attract investment in regional products as 
strengthening or expanding any intellectual 
property right makes investments more secure 
and consequently raises levels of investment. 
Expanding the scope of Article 23 would 
increase the value of GI and encourage more 
quality and niche products to be put on the 
world’s markets. Because there are unique 
products in developing countries, increased 
GI protection will attract investors to these 
regions. 
Increased investment due to heightened 
GI protection would allow producers in 
developing countries to develop economies 
of scale.70 Development through foreign 
investment would help close the gap between 
developing and developed countries. To 
promote economic equality between the 
North and South, developing countries must 
be allowed to partake in the undeniable 
economic advantage of GIs. Therefore, there 
is the need to capitalize on the opportunity to 
increase investment in regional products by 
expanding the coverage of Article 23.
Additionally, extension would help 
developing countries gain market power 
because GI frequently protects the types of 
products common to developing countries. 
GI have been identified as being especially 
promising protection because they tend to 
protect the types of goods that are most 
common to developing societies. If a good 
is to bear a GI, it must have special qualities 
attributable to the good’s geographical 
source.71 GI goods tend to be from the rural, 
agricultural and handicraft sectors of the 
economy, further implicating the interests of 
developing countries.72 
b.	 Benefits	Outweighs	the	Cost
Although the GI extension would benefit 
the developing world, it has been argued that 
extension would actually be disadvantageous 
to developing countries because their legal 
and administrative capacities are currently 
limited and would require costly expansion.73 
However, developing countries need not be 
held to the same implementation obligations 
as developed counterparts. Extension of 
Article 23 could be accompanied by special 
exceptions for developing countries that 
soften the new obligations. The TRIPS 
itself states that “Members shall be free 
to determine the appropriate method 
of implementing the provisions of this 
Agreement within their own legal system and 
practice”.74 Therefore, developing countries 
have discretion to comply TRIPS obligations 
and could find ways to minimize the cost of 
compliance following substantive changes in 
the TRIPS. Presumably, developing countries 
already have legal regime as they are already 
required to protect GI in Article 23. Thus, 
any new legal mechanisms should not be 
needed, although the scope of goods covered 
by Article 23 would be different if extension 
occurred.75 Indeed, “unlike any other IP, 
70 Ibid.
71 Article 22.1. of TRIPS Agreement. 
72 Dwijen Rangnekar, “The Socio-Economics of Geographical Indications: A Review of Empirical Evidence From Europe”, Paper, 2004, p. 1 
(hereinafter Dwijen Rangnekar II).
73 Felix Addor , Alexandra Grazioli, Op.cit., p. 29.
74 Article 1.1. of TRIPS Agreement.
75 Dwinjen Rangnekar I, Op.cit., p. 28.
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demanders for stronger protection include 
many developing countries”.76 Developing 
counties will be much better off as a result of 
the additional GI protections.77 Developing 
countries stand to gain significantly and could 
benefit most from an effective and stronger 
GI protection.78 Therefore, limited short-term 
costs should not be treated as reasons to avoid 
opportunities for long-term development.
C. Conclusion
 The issue of extending Article 23 protection 
to all geographical indications has have been the 
subject of on going negotiations in WTO forum and 
it has also been linked with the controversial issue 
of international trade.79 The extensive GI protection 
must be supported as current GI provision under 
TRIPS is insufficient and discriminative. Low 
standard of Article 22 and disparity hierarchy 
between Article 22 and 23 are also the reasons 
for extension which is mandated by Article 24. 
Preventing free-riding including preventing GI 
being generic, as well as the positive effects of 
extension should be considered to support the GI 
extension.
76 Dwijen Rangnekar II, Op.cit., p. 1.
77 Felix Addor, Alexandra Grazioli I, Op.cit.., p. 29.
78 Felix Addor and Alexandra Grazioli, “Geographical Indications: Important Issues for Industrialized and Developing Countries”, The IPTS 
Report, May 2003, p. 29 (hereinafter Felix Addor, Alexandra Grazioli II).
79 Burkhart Goebel, “Geographical Indications and Trademarks – The Road from DOHA”, Trademark Reporter, Vol. 93, 2003, p. 987.
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